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Abstract
During the last decades, we have witnessed a strong development of intangible digital technologies. Soft-
ware, artificial intelligence and algorithms are increasingly affecting both production systems and our lives;
economists have started to figure out the long-run complex economic implications of this new technological
wave. In this paper, we address this question through the agent-based modelling approach. In particular, we
enrich the macroeconomic model Eurace with the concept of intangible digital technology and investigate its
effects both at the micro and macro level. Results show the emergence of the relevant stylized facts observed
in the business domain, such as increasing returns, winner-take-most phenomena and market lock-in. At
the macro level, our main finding is an increasing unemployment level, since the sizeable decrease of the
employment rate in the mass-production system, provided by the higher productivity of digital assets, is
usually not counterbalanced by the new jobs created in the digital sector.
Keywords: Intangible assets, Digital transformation, Technological unemployment, Agent-based economics
1. Introduction
During the course of history, several technological discoveries influenced the lives of human beings. In
this paper we focus our attention on the impact of the digital transformation on the production systems and,
as a consequence, we evaluate the potential variation of the employment rate in the long term. According
to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), we are facing “The Second Machine Age” that is revolutionising our
world. In particular, the authors argue that probably one of the most important technological discovery has
been the steam engine, created by John Watt in the second half of the eighteenth century, which allowed to
produce a huge amount of mechanical energy. After that, there have been further technological developments
that affected our production systems and, thanks to electronics and information technology, in the second
half of the twentieth century the assembly lines have been largely automated. Nowadays, we are facing a
new technological wave, in fact, digital technologies have been the subject of an intense improvement and
the possible consequences of this productivity enhancement are currently debated among economists.
The potential effects of technological transitions on the labour market have been the subject of a long de-
bate among economists since the first industrial revolution. Potential outcomes deriving from technological
progress have been distinguished between: short-term disruption and long-term benefits, see Mokyr et al.
(2015). In fact, according to the “Compensation Theory”, in the long-term, compensation mechanisms coun-
terbalance the unemployment created by technological progress, see Vivarelli (2014). Along this line, the
technological unemployment is only temporary: the economy experiences a structural change rather than
the so-called “end of work”, Vermeulen et al. (2018). However, the nature of new digital technologies is
different compared to machines deriving from the steam engine and traditional automation. The substantial
difference between digital technologies and traditional industrial automation is that while the latter helps
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human beings to overcome the limits linked to physical force, thanks to the former we can surmount the
limits imposed by our mind. Moreover, several economists and technologists argue that artificial intelligence,
thanks to significant improvements in computation, could become self-improving causing a technological sin-
gularity, see Good (1966); Nordhaus (2015); Aghion et al. (2017).
According to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017, 2018a,b,c,d), AI and robotics, as automation, replace human
beings in jobs that they previously performed, creating a “displacement effect” and this destruction of job
places could only be effectively countervailed by the creation of new labour-intensive tasks. Moreover, em-
pirical evidences show a labour market polarization: whereas technology until the end of the XX century
has impacted principally on workplaces occupied by “blue-collars” workers, probably these kinds of digital
instruments will mainly affect the so called “white-collars” workers performing jobs which require routine
manual and cognitive skills, see Goos and Manning (2007).
Furthermore, it’s really interesting to notice how the business dynamics related to the companies which
develop and produce digital technologies are completely different compared to the economic dynamics that
characterized mass-productions. As a matter of fact, Arthur (1989, 1990, 1994, 1996) distinguishes between
two different worlds: a mass-production world, characterized by diminishing returns, in which products are
heavy on resources and light on knowledge and a knowledge-based world that, on the contrary, is character-
ized by increasing returns. In this particular reality, which regards high-tech producers, products require a
deep know-how and scarce quantity of resources; in other words, these companies have high R&D fixed costs
compared to their variable production costs. Furthermore, according to Arthur, the world ruled by increas-
ing returns presents several other characteristics as network effects, path dependence, market instability,
unexpectedness, winner-take-all and technological lock-in. These features are being studied in a field called
Complexity Economics which, unlike the standard economic theory, emphasizes interaction among economic
agents through an out-of-equilibrium approach, see Elsner et al. (2014); Arthur (1999, 2014); Fontana (2010).
Agent-based modelling represents an appropriate approach in order to address these aspects, see Gallegati
(2018); North and Macal (2007); Hommes and LeBaron (2018). Out-of-equilibrium dynamics, complex
interactions among economic agents and heterogeneity represent three important features that can be en-
compassed by agent-based modelling. Since the AI advent can be framed as a transition phase in the
technological progress history, an out-of-equilibrium approach, as the agent-based one, can be an effective
way to represent this structural and productive transformation. Furthermore, by capturing heterogeneity
between economic agents we can distinguish between different types of productive capital: hard capital and
intangible or digital capital. The need of heterogeneity to study the potential effect of a digital transforma-
tion is also reflected by labour force: workers are heterogeneous and they differ in skills. Finally, interactions
drive several features of the “increasing returns” world, as for example network effects, lock-in and winner-
take-most-phenomena.
In this paper, we enrich a pre-existent large-scale macroeconomics model, called Eurace (see Mazzocchetti
et al. (2018); Ponta et al. (2018); Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al. (2012)) to tackle our research questions.
The concept of innovation has already been investigated by means of agent based models (see e.g Pyka
et al. (2010); Dosi et al. (2010); Caiani et al. (2019); Fanti (2018); Dawid and Reimann (2011); Vermeulen
and Pyka (2014, 2018)), and also the Eurace model has been endowed with the concept of innovation, see
Dawid et al. (2008); Dawid and Gemkow (2014); Dawid et al. (2014, 2018, 2019). However, we focus here
on innovation from the perspective of productivity increases due to intangible digital capital goods, not only
tangible ones. Software, algorithms, artificial intelligence and their developers are the subject of our study,
as we want to link the concept of innovation to the one of “digital revolution”, as described in Brynjolfsson
and McAfee (2011). The addition of digital technologies in the Eurace model mimics the advent of Industry
4.0, according to which not only the production processes are automated, but also decisions start to be
subject to automation technology, see Kang et al. (2016); Parrott and Lane (2017); Cotteleer and Sniderman
(2017). From a macro perspective, the research work tries to address and evaluate the potential effect of a
digital transformation on the economic system. Furthermore, at a micro level, our analysis aims to study the
main business dynamics characterizing the digital technology producers. In this respect, the novelty of our
contribution concerns the introduction of a new type of capital producer within a large-scale macroeconomic
agent-based model: the intangible or digital assets developer.
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The introduction of this new kind of firm, which belong to the “increasing returns world”, turns out to be
crucial in order to better understand and investigate the economic implication of digital technologies on
business, both from a macro and micro point of view. In fact, being a bottom up approach, agent-based
modelling gives us the opportunity to study not only the macroeconomic trend of the system but also the
sectorial behaviours.
The new Eurace model features about the production of digital intangible technologies are presented in
Section 2. Section 3 shows our preliminary computational results. Conclusion and remarks are provided in
Section 4.
2. The Eurace model and the digital economy
2.1. Outline of the Eurace model
A description of the baseline version of the Eurace model that has been used in this paper can be found
in Teglio et al. (2019), while Petrovic´ et al. (2017) explain the model in more detail1. In this section we
recall the basic features of the model that can be useful for the interpretation of the results presented in the
paper.
The model includes several types of economic agents, in particular: consumption goods producers (CGPs)
that manufacture a homogeneous consumption good; a capital good producer (KGP), which produces in-
vestment goods (for instance machine tools); households (HHs), that perform as workers, financial investors
and consumers; and commercial banks (Bs). There are also two policy maker agents: the government (G)
and the central bank (CB), responsible for fiscal and monetary policy, respectively. In order to study the
impact of digital technologies on the economic system, a new economic agent, i.e., the intangible digital
assets developer (DAD), has been designed and included in the model.
A graphical illustration of the Eurace model version that has been used in this paper is reported in Fig.
1. Ellipses and rectangles represent the different agents typologies, whereas arrows indicate the presence of
current account monetary flows between the corresponding agents. In particular, rectangles are used when
only one instance of the agent class is considered (and simulated) in the model, e.g. one government, while
ellipses show the presence of multiple heterogeneous instances of that agent class, e.g. several banks. The
yellow background refers to the newly introduced agent.
Agents interacts in different decentralised or centralised artificial markets. Centralised are consumption and
capital goods, labour and credit markets, whereas decentralised is the financial market where firms’ (or
banks’) stocks and government’s bonds are traded. Bounded rationality, limited capabilities of computa-
tion and limited information gathering characterise agents’ behavior. Finally, the Stock-Flow-consistency
approach represents a distinctive feature of the Eurace model, where each agent is in fact represented as
a dynamic balance sheet which includes the details regarding assets and liabilities; see Godley and Lavoie
(2012); Godin and Caverzasi (2014); Ponta et al. (2018); Raberto et al. (2018).
The shorter time step in the model scheduling is the day, which is the frequency for financial market trans-
actions, however, most agents’ decisions occur at a weekly, monthly, or even yearly periodicity, and are
asynchronous. Consumption budget decisions are made monthly by households but purchases are made on
weekly basis; all firms’ decision about production planning have a monthly asynchronous periodicity, i.e.,
each firm has its own activation day in the month. Finally, policy makers act on a monthly or yearly basis.
1Petrovic´ et al. (2017) delineate a multi-country version of the model but the description is still valid if only one country is
considered, as in the present study.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the present Eurace model in terms of agent classes (ellipses or rectangles) and current account monetary flows (arrows). Rectangles
are used when just one instance of the class in considered in the model, whereas ellipses are intended to represent the presence of multiple heterogeneous instances of
the agent class. The yellow background refers to newly introduced agent.
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In the following, we present a summary of the core decisions taken by main agents in the model.
Household
The household is active in the financial, labour, goods and housing markets. As a trader, it allocates its
financial wealth among the available assets, which are bonds issued by the government and stock of firms
and banks. As a worker, if unemployed, the household enters the labour market to evaluate pending job
offers. It is randomly queued to apply to the set of available jobs with the highest wages, provided that they
are higher than the reservation wage. Household receive a monthly salary, which constitutes, along with
the financial returns on bonds and stocks, the total income of the household. On the basis of total income,
households decide the consumption budget, according to a target wealth to income ratio, in line with the
buffer-stock saving behaviour theory (Carroll (2001)). Households’ decision about the product to buy is
driven by purchasing probabilities based on the price.
Firm (CGP)
The firm in the Eurace model takes decision about the factors of production and how to finance them.
Firms can ask credit to banks or they can issue new stocks. They distribute dividends to shareholders, which
are initially all households (later it depends on financial market transactions). In particular, we present the
core of the scheduling procedure for firms.
• The firm estimates the expected demand based on past sales.
• It determines the new desired production, given the level of the current inventory stock.
• It computes the needed labour force to meet the production target, determining the labour demand,
and posting vacancies (if any), or firing. In particular, if the number of workers is higher than what
needed by production target, CGP fires the workers in excess, otherwise it enters labour market to hire
new employees. CGP sets an initial wage offer and, if it is not capable to hire all the needed workers,
it increases the initial offer by a fixed parameter and starts a second round. If the target is not reached
for the second time, CGP exits the labour market. However, it increases the wage offer again and this
will represent the initial offer for the next monthly labour market session, see Teglio et al. (2019).
• It determines a desired level of investment by comparing the net present value of future additional cash
flows with the current cost of the investment.
• The firm looks for financing, following the pecking order theory: first retained earnings, then debt,
then equity.
• If rationed, the firm reduces costs in order to make the total financial needs consistent with the
available resources. First, the total dividend payout is reduced up to zero, then, if still not sufficient,
the investment plan is sized down and, eventually, the production plan as well.
• The firm can go bankrupt, undergoing a restructuring of its debt with a related loan write-off and a
corresponding equity loss on creditor banks’ balance sheets, and staying inactive for a period of time
after which it enters again the market with a healthy balance sheet. Physical capital of insolvent firms
is therefore not lost but remains inactive for a while.
Bank (CGP)
The bank role in the model is to provide credit to private agents; to firm in form of loans and to house-
holds in form of mortgages. When a bank receives a loan request by a firm, the request is evaluated and a
loan eventually offered at a price that depends on the risk associated to the default probability of the firm.
A similar procedure is used by the bank to assess the creditworthiness of households asking for mortgage
loans (detail are in Ozel et al. (2019)). Bank’s lending is also limited by the obligation to respect the min-
imum capital requirements enforced by Basel II regulation. It is worth noting that money in the model is
endogenous, as new deposits are created every time a bank issues new credit.
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Policy makers
The central bank provides liquidity in infinite supply to banks, acting as lender of last resort. It also sets
the policy rate according to a dual mandate rule, i.e., low unemployment and stable prices.
The government ensures a welfare system through fiscal policy. Taxes come from corporate earnings,
consumption (VAT), financial income and labour income. Government expenditures include the public sec-
tor wage bill, unemployment benefits, transfers, and interest payment on debt. On a monthly basis, if in
short of liquidity, the government issues new bonds, which are perpetuities that pay a monthly fixed coupon.
The model has not been calibrated to any specific real-world economy; however, it is worth noting that
all agents’ balance sheet variables have been initialized in a consistent way and with relative ratios derived
from the literature or from the empirical evidence observed in advanced economies. For instance, the initial
debt-to-equity ratio of firms is set to 2, which is a realistic value for companies in the industrial sector;
banks’ equity to risk-weighted assets ratio is initialized to 20%. Furthermore, the initial value of public
debt is set to a value that, assuming a 10% unemployment rate and the initial productive capacity of firms,
would set the debt-to-GDP ratio around to 100%, which is in line with the average Eurozone value. As for
empirical validation, it is worth noting that the simulated time series generated by the model match the main
stylized facts about volatility of investments and consumption and about the correlation structure of GDP.
In particular, we observe that GDP is positively correlated with investments and consumption, and it is
anti-correlated with the unemployment rate. GDP also shows a positive correlation with firms’ loans, which
are leading the business cycle expansion, and an anti-correlation with firms’ defaults, which are following a
contraction of the economy. For further details about the validation and calibration of the model, see Teglio
et al. (2019).
As pointed out by Platt (2019), further developments of agent-based model calibration techniques are re-
quired in order to definitively calibrate large-scale models, like Eurace; however, future research will explore
the feasibility of a full calibration of the model or of part of it, by resorting to Bayesian inference.
2.2. Eurace: a stock-flow-consistent model
Following Godley and Lavoie (2012) and Godin and Caverzasi (2014), a compact description of the stock-
flow-consistent Eurace model is presented through the following tables that outline the stocks (balance sheet
entries) and flows (income statement entries) that characterize the Eurace agents. The stock-flow-consistent
modelling approach provides a set of relevant theoretical identities at the agent, sector, and aggregate level,
whose subsistence need to be numerically verified during the simulation, thus providing a very important
diagnostic and validation tool for the model and its implementation. The first table presented is the agent
class balance sheet table (Table 1), that shows the asset and liability entries of each particular agent type.
The second one is the sectorial balance sheet table (Table 2), that presents the assets and liabilities aggregated
over a sector (all agents belonging to the same class). Columns report the aggregated balance sheet of each
sector, whereas rows identify the relations among sectors by spotting the liabilities (with minus sign) in one
sector and the corresponding claims, i.e. assets (with plus sign), in another sector, thus generally summing
up to zero. Exceptions are: the capital goods accumulated by firms; inventories; housing units and equity
shares2 owned by households.
The third table is the cash flow matrix (Table 3), that show the monetary flows among sectors, both in
the current and capital account. The current account reports aggregate revenues (plus sign) and payments
(minus sign) among sectors, therefore summing to zero along the rows. The capital account reports the
endogenous money creation / destruction operations by means of borrowing/debt repayment by private
agents with banks. These operations, along with the current account net cash flows, determines the liquidity
change of a sector.
Finally, the fourth is the revaluation matrix (Table 4) that provides the information about changes in sectors’
net worth (equity) between periods. In particular, agents’ net worth dynamics depends on net cash flows in
2We assume that equity shares in households’ portfolio do not sum up to zero with the corresponding equity counterpart in
the issuer balance sheet because of the usual difference between market price and book value.
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the current account, physical capital depreciation and price changes in financial (stocks and bonds) and real
(housing units, capital goods and inventories of consumption goods) assets.
Table 1: Balance sheets of any agent class characterizing the Eurace economy. Balance sheet entries in the table have a
subscript character, that is the index of an agent in the class to which the variable refers. In some cases, we can find two
subscript characters, where the second one refers to the index of an agent in another class where there is the balance-sheet
counterpart. For instance, Df refers to the total debt of firm f , i.e. a liability, and Lb refers to the aggregate loans of bank b,
i.e. an asset. ℓf,b (or ℓb,f ) refer to the loans granted by banks b to firms f . Of course,
∑
b Lb =
∑
f ℓb,f represents an aggregate
balance sheet identity, that is verified along the entire simulation. nEh,x represent the number of outstanding equity shares of
agents x held by households h. The market price of the equity shares is given by pEx . The stock portfolio’s value of household
h is then computed as:
∑
x nEh,xpEx . Government bonds’ number and market price are given by nG and pG, respectively.
Agent class Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity: Mh Mortgages: Uh
abbrev.: HH Stock portfolio: Equity: Eh
index : h = 1, . . . , NHous ΣbnEh,bpEb+
ΣfnEh,f pEf+
nEh,K pEK +
ΣdnEh,dpEd +
Gov Bonds: nh,G pG
Housing units: Xh
Consumption Goods Producer Liquidity: Mf Debt: Df =
∑
b ℓf,b
abbrev.: CGP Capital goods: Kf Equity: Ef
index : f = 1, . . . , NFirm Inventories: If
Capital Goods Producer Liquidity: MK Equity: EK
abbrev.: KGP Inventories: IK
Digital Assets Developers Liquidity: Md Equity: Ed
abbrev.: DAD Licences: nl,d
index : d = 1, . . . , NDADs
Bank Liquidity: Mb Deposits :
abbrev.: B Db =
∑
hMb,h +
∑
f Mb,f +Mb,K
index : b = 1, . . . , NBank Loans: Lb =
∑
f ℓb,f CB standing facility: Db = ℓb,CB
Mortgages: Ub =
∑
h Ub,h Equity: Eb
Government Liquidity: MG
Outstanding government bonds value :
DG = nG pG
abbrev.: G Equity: EG
Central Bank Liquidity: MCB Outstanding fiat money: FiatCB
abbrev.: CB
Loans to banks: LCB =∑
b ℓCB,b
Deposits:
Gov Bonds: nCB,G pG DCB =
∑
bMb +MG
Equity: ECB
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Table 2: Sectorial balance sheet matrix. Subscripts represent the index of the agent or of the sector (i.e. the set of all agents of the same class) to which the stock
refers. Uppercase indexes are used when the stock refers to the whole sector, e.g. F refers to the sector of all CGPs and to the aggregate value of a particular stock in
the sector, whereas lowercase subscripts are used when it refers to the single agent (for instance in the case of sums). Finally, superscript characters are introduced in
the case of government bonds units nG, i.e. n
H
G and n
CB
G , and LoansB , i.e. Loans
F
B and Loans
RP
B , because the balance sheet counterpart (in the asset side) is hold
by two sectors, i.e. households and central bank in the case of government bonds units and consumption good producers and renewable power producer in the case of
loans.
Sectors
Non-Financial Private Agents (NFPAs) Banks Policy Makers Σ
HHs CGPs KGP DADs Bs G CB
Tangible Capital +XH pX +KF pK +Xh pX +KF pK
Inventories +IF pC +IK pK +IF pC +IK pK
Debt(-) / Credit(+) –UH –DF
+DF
+UH
–ℓCB
+ℓCB 0
Liquidity:
NFPA
Banks/Gov
Central Bank
+MH +MF +MK +MDAD -DB
+MB +MG - DCB
+MCB –FiatCB
0
0
+MCB,0
Gov Bonds +nHG pG –nG pG +n
CB
G pG 0
Equity Shares (+) /
Net worth (-)
+ΣfnEf pEf
+nEkpEk
+ΣdnEDAD,dpEDAD,d
+ΣbnEbpEb
–EH
–EF
–EK
–EDAD
–EB
–EG –ECB
+ΣfnEf pEf − EF
+nEkpEk − EK
ΣdnEdpEd − EDAD
+ΣbnEbpEb − EB
−EH − EG − ECB
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 3: Sectorial transaction flow matrix of agents populating the EURACE economy. Note that HH stands fo Households, CGP stands for Consumption
Goods Producer, KGP stands for Capital Goods Producer, DAD stands for Digital Assets Developers, Gov stands for Government and CB stands for Central Bank.
HHs CGPs KGP DAD Bs G CB Σ
Current
Account
Consumption goods – + 0
Investment goods – + 0
Licences – + 0
Training courses – + 0
Wages + – – – – 0
Transfers + – 0
Taxes – – – – – + 0
Dividends + – – – – 0
Coupons + – + 0
CB coupons payback + – 0
Banks loan interests – + 0
Banks mortgage
interests
– + 0
CB loans interests – + 0
CB interests payback + – 0
= = = = = = =
Net cash flow Savings Profits Profits Profits Profits Surplus Seignoirage 0
Capital
Account
Net cash flow +Savings +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Surplus +Seignoirage 0
∆ Loans +∆DF
–∆DF
+LCB
–∆LCB 0
∆ Mortgages +UH - UH 0
∆ Issue of new
shares / bonds
–Σf pEf
∆nEf
–pG∆nG
+Σf pEf
∆nEf +pG∆nG
0
∆ Quantitative
easing
+pG∆n
QE
G
–pG∆n
QE
G
0
∆ Private Liquidity
& ∆ Banks’ deposits
–∆ MH –∆ MF –∆ MK –∆ MDAD +∆ DB 0
∆ Banks / Public
Liquidity
& ∆ Central bank
deposits
–∆ MB –∆ MG +∆ DCB 0
∆ CB Liquidity /
∆ Fiat Money
–∆ MCB
+∆ FiatCB
0
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 4: Sectorial revaluation matrix. The matrix provides information about changes in sectors’ net worth (equity) between periods. Net worth changes depend on
net cash flows in the current account, physical capital depreciation (at rate ξK) and price changes in real and financial assets. It is worth noting that net worth of the
issuers of financial assets (firms and the government) are not subject to asset price changes.
HHs CGPs KGP DADs Bs G CB Σ
Equityt−1 EH,t−1 EF,t−1 EK,t−1 EDAD,t−1 EB,t−1 EG,t−1 ECB,t−1 ETOT,t−1
Net cash flow +Savings +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Surplus +Seignoirage 0
Revaluations/
Devaluations
Housing units +ΣhXh∆pX +ΣhXh∆pX
Capital
+ΣfKf∆pK
-Σf ξKKfpK
+ΣfKf∆pK -Σf ξKKfpK
Inventories +Σf If∆pc +IK∆pK +Σf If∆pc +IK∆pK
Equity shares
+ΣfnEf
∆pEf
+ΣbnEb
∆pEb
+nEK
∆pEK
+ΣdnEDAD
∆pEDAD
+ΣfnEf
∆pEf
+ΣbnEb
∆pEb
+nEK
∆pEK
+ΣdnEd
∆pEd
Bonds +nH
G
∆pG +n
CB
G
∆pG +n
H
G
∆pG +n
CB
G
∆pG
= = = = = = = =
Equity EH,t EF,t EK,t EDAD,t EB,t EG,t ECB,t ETOT,t
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2.3. Intangible digital assets
As said above, in the present study, the Eurace model is enriched by a new class of productive capi-
tal, which is represented by intangible digital assets, say software or any other digitalized knowledge-based
assets, e.g., algorithms, advanced routines, instructions. These new capital assets are developed and sup-
plied by a new class of agents, namely the intangible digital assets developer (DAD), and are employed
in the production process by CGPs with the purpose of rising total factor productivity (TFP). Intangible
digital assets are heterogeneous among the different DADs active in the economy, depending on their ac-
cumulated digital knowledge, which increases over time based on the R&D investments made. Obviously,
this new type of asset implies the existence of a novel digital market, in which DADs can potentially compete.
2.4. Supply side
In line with the literature on intangible capital, see e.g. Haskel and Westlake (2017), we assume that
intangible digital assets are non-rivalrous, i.e., they are characterized by zero marginal production costs.
In particular, production costs are actually given only by the R&D costs, which are determined by the
cumulated labor costs of the skilled labor force employed at any DAD agent.
On a monthly basis, each DAD agent d has a chance to develop a new version of its digital capital asset,
which is characterized by higher knowledge content, and therefore higher productivity when employed in the
production process by CGPs. The probability probd of a successful completion of the new digital asset version
depends on the cumulated person months Md employed by the DAD since the latest version developed, as
follows:
probd = 1−
1
1 + ηMd
(1)
where η is a shape parameter, homogeneous across all DAD agents, setting the development speed, i.e., the
higher is η, the higher is the probability to develop an improved version of digital assets, for any level of
cumulated person monthsMd employed. The rationale behind Eq. 1 is to set the probability as an increasing
monotone function of cumulated human efforts devoted to R&D, but with decreasing returns to scale. It is
also worth noting that R&D is modelled here as an uncertain activity whose positive outcome, i.e., a higher
level of knowledge reached by the DAD, leading to an improved version of its produced digital asset, is never
granted in principle, since the probability is equal to 1 only asymptotically for an infinite number of person
months.
DADs determine the number of employees monthly according to their revenues, precisely the needed work-
force is set so that the wage bill is a fixed fraction of the DADs monthly turnover. Obviously, this means
that the number of employees in the DADs sector is inuenced not only by revenues, but also by the average
wage characterizing the economy. Concerning the hiring process, DADs enter the labor market and perform
exactly same procedures of CGPs with whom they compete for the labor force. However, there is an im-
portant difference: while CGPs hire households from the highest (fifth level) to the lowest (first) education
level indistinctly, yet prioritizing highly educated workers, DADs employ only workers with a high degree of
education (from the third level upwards) to be employ them in the research activities and then develop new
intangible digital assets.
2.5. Demand side
Intangible digital assets are demanded by CGPs which pay a user license to DADs for their utilization.
According to the model design, every CGP adopts one intangible digital technology at a time, i.e. its digital
assets in use are supplied by only one DAD. The knowledge level of the employed digital technology sets
the TFP of the CGP. In particular, along the lines of Teglio et al. (2019), we consider the labor force Nf ,
employed at any CGP f , and its physical capital endowment Kf , as the production factors used for the
production of consumption goods qCf , according to a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to
scale, i.e.,
qCf = γfN
α
f K
β
f = γfN
α
f K
1−α
f (2)
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where α and β are the production elasticity parameters and γf is the TFP. An important novelty with respect
to the baseline Eurace model is that γf is not anymore an homogeneous constant across all the CGPs but a
variable, specific to each CGP, which increases over time based on the knowledge content κd of the digital
asset adopted by each CGP, i.e. the digital knowledge level reached by its supplying DAD agent. Through
this assumption, we model a total factor augmenting technological progress1. In particular, the TFP γf is
modelled as follows:
γf = exp(1 + ηγκd) (3)
where ηγ is a scale parameter homogeneous across all CGPs whereas κd represents the knowledge level of
the digital asset adopted. In case of a successful R&D activity, the latter increases by a fixed tick equal to
δκ according to the following relation:
κdt = κdt−1 + δκ (4)
It is worth noting that, while in the baseline Eurace version total factor productivity depends as well on
the workforce’ specific skills2, in this extension we assume that TFP γf is only influenced by the digital
technological progress.
For the right of use of its intangible digital technology, a DAD agent d charges CGP f a monthly amount
of money proportional to the level of capital endowment Kf of CGP f , i.e., an amount equal to pDdKf ,
where pDd , set by the DAD agent, could be considered as a user license unit price. The rationale of this
modelling feature is that, even if intangible digital assets are non-rivalrous, then replicable many times at no
additional cost irrespective of the size of the CGP’s capital, the related services of installation, maintenance,
and assistance, which we assume are provided by DADs as well, are an increasing monotone function of the
size of capital stock. For instance, often the price of software licenses depends on the number of computers
where it is installed. For the sake of simplicity, we state that this dependence is linear and that the DAD
agent simply charges a unit license cost pDd multiplied by the size of physical capital, say computers, or more
generally physical machines that can be automatized and therefore more productive, due to the intangible
digital technology.
On a monthly basis, the CGP has a given exogenous probability probf to consider the adoption of a different
digital technology, i.e. to assess costs and benefits of switching from the present digital supplier d to another
one d∗. In particular, the cost-benefit analysis consists in computing the net present value (NPV) of expected
net future cash flows that the CGP would get with the switch, as follows:
NPVd∗ =
pCf (q
∗
Cf
− qCf )
rD
+
(pDd − pDd∗ )Kf
rD
− wNˆf , (5)
where the first term gives the present value of the gain (loss) in future revenues, the second addend is given
by difference between the user license unit price of the new digital technology under consideration and the
one currently in adoption, the third and final term takes into account the training costs that the firm would
face for its personnel to manage the new digital technology. The variable rD represents the weighted average
cost of capital proxied by the corporate loan rate. In particular, the first addend of Eq. 5 takes into account
that the difference in productivity between the two technologies (see Eq. 3) generates a different expected
production level, given the present endowment of production factors, according to Eq. 2, and therefore
1A total factor augmenting approach shall be considered as a suitable modelling choice to capture a key empirical fact
connected to the digital transformation of the economy. Indeed, empirical evidences show a high correlation between total
factor productivity and intangible investments, see Haskel and Westlake (2017). Moreover, according to Uzawa (1961), a
technological progress is both Hicks and Harrod neutral (labour-augmenting) if and only if the production function is in the
form of Eq. 2. Notwithstanding the debate concerning the average trend of technological progress is still open among economists,
the literature regarding empirical analysis leans towards Hicks and Harrod neutrality. This tendency underpins our choice to
adopt the Cobb-Douglass production technology with constant return to scale to model the introduction of digital intangible
innovation, see Solow (1957); Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2018); Kalt (1978).
2Households are endowed with a specific skill which varies according to their labour activity: the longer their job career the
higher the specific skill value.
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different expected future revenues3. The second term of Eq. 5 takes into account the difference in the
user license bill. In this respect, the CGP usually faces a trade-off between expected higher (lower) future
revenues due to a more (less) productive alternative digital technology and higher (lower) costs for the digital
services provided by the DAD, since higher (lower) productivity of the digital asset are usually accompanied
with higher (lower) unit user license price, as outlined in the next section.
2.6. Digital asset price dynamics
On a monthly basis, each CGP transfers to its reference DAD d a money amount to pay for the license
fee, which is equal to the unit license price PDd times the number of licences held by the consumption goods
producer.
The unit license price is set by the DAD. To study the behaviour of the economic system under two different
competitive scenarios, two different pricing mechanisms have been considered, namely “price collusion” and
“price competition” regimes. Under the “price collusion” regime, all DADs adopt the same unit license price
PDd over time, whereas in the competitive case, each DAD adapts the licence price independently according
to the dynamics of license sales, with the purpose to get market shares. In both cases, the license price is
be proportional to the average wage w in the economy. The rationale of this modelling choice is to relate
the dynamics of revenues of digital firms (DADs) to the one of costs, which consist only in labour costs, i.e.
wages.
The user license unit price pDd for each DAD in case of “collusive pricing” follows this relation:
pDd = λw (6)
where the mark-up λ, in case of “collusive pricing”, is an exogenous and homogeneous parameter , while in
the “competitive” case the price can increase or decrease over time according to a simple thumb rule based
on past sales. If the DAD increased the number of sold licences, it also increases the mark-up by a fixed tick
equal to δλ, otherwise it reduces price by the same amount:{
λt+1 = λt + δλ if Qt > Qt−1
λt+1 = λt − δλ if Qt ≤ Qt−1
(7)
This variable mark-up policy allows DADs to manage the fluctuations of sales by means of a trade-off
between mark-up and market shares, see Fraser (1985); Goldstein (1986a,b). In fact, DADs perform their
business activities in an economic environment characterized by uncertainty and, in case of sales contractions,
a lower price could determine higher revenues by gaining market shares at the expense of competitors. In
this respect, as shown in Eq. 5, the user license unit price could determine the transition from a certain
digital technologies to a cheaper one. Furthermore, through this pricing behavioural assumption, DADs can
exploit expansion phases of their sales, then increasing then increasing their profits by raising mark-up.
Therefore, in case of “competitive pricing”, λ assumes a heterogeneous and variable connotation.
2.7. Employees digital technologies skills
The third term of the Eq. 5 is related to the training costs which a company should bear in order to train
workers with the alternative digital technologies. Every worker is endowed with a set of “digital technologies”
skills, that can be as large as the number of DADs present in the economy. These skills represent the employee
ability to handle the different types of digital assets, which can be augmented by means of training courses
provided by the DADs. Therefore, revenues of DADs come from two different activities: the selling of licenses
and the training courses. From a modelling point of view, the training costs for the company are given by
the number of workers (Nˆf ) that are still not trained with the “digital technologies”, multiplied by the
training cost per worker (w) which is equal to the average wage characterizing the macroeconomic system.
The lower these switching costs, the higher the probability to adopt a new kind of digital assets. In fact,
3The implicit assumption made here is that all consumption goods will be sold at the present price pCf .
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with this particular micro-assumption, we want to model the presence inside Eurace macro-economy of an
indirect network effect according to which economic benefits arise indirectly from the interaction of different
groups, Farrell and Klemperer (2007); Belleflamme and Peitz (2018); Heinrich (2018). In fact, companies
virtually benefit from the ”digital technologies” skill of their workers and this precisely happens when they
are valuing a possible digital assets change: the higher the number of workers with that particular skill, the
lower the transition costs to that alternative digital technologies which could be cheaper or more productive,
see 5. Obviously, not only companies can benefit from the skills acquired by their workers in case of a digital
technology transition but, at the same time, DADs can profit from employees skills: the higher the number
of workers able to use their digital assets, the higher the probability to sell their products.
The diffusion of these skills among workers increases competitiveness lowering the switching costs between
digital technologies. In fact, skills propagation inside the model allows CGPs to pass more easily from a
technology to another one by reducing switching costs. In this respect, it is worth noting that, on a monthly
base, a fraction of workers resigns to find better job opportunities or it is fired by CGPs. This continuous
turnover characterizing the Eurace labour market helps the diffusion among CGPs of the predominant digital
technologies reflected on the long term inside the economy by the number of workers with that “digital
technologies” skill.
Moreover, these skills do not influence CGPs production processes and employment sessions. In fact, in this
version of the model, firms are willing to bear training courses costs: their hiring preference is oriented to
education levels. Even though CGPs production is not affected by digital technologies skills, each worker
must be trained to manage the adopted digital asset in order to start the process.
3. Computational results
3.1. Design of experiments
The new features of the model allow us to analyse different scenarios. In particular, we consider two
digital assets pricing scenarios. In the first one, named “collusive pricing”, DADs sell their licenses at the
same price, determined as a fixed share of the nominal wage. In the second one, henceforth “competitive
pricing” scenario, we endowed the firm with the possibility to raise or decrease independently their license
prices; the choice between these two options depends on the market share owned by them: the bigger the
share, the higher the price and vice versa, as outlined in the previous section. In order to conduct an in-depth
analysis, we explore the two cases previously described with six different values of η, the parameter which
controls the probability to develop an improved version of the digital asset, see Eq. 1; in this way we obtain
twelve different scenarios.
The methodology of our study is based on Monte Carlo computational experiments: each scenario is simulated
with twenty different seeds of the pseudorandom number generator. So, a total of 240 simulations has
been considered in order to conduct our investigation. All the parameters are identical across the different
scenarios except for η. The computational results shown in the following subsections, in accordance with
the methodology used, are presented in the form of boxplots, a practical way to present data distribution.
In particular, each boxplot shows the distribution of the time averages of relevant variables over a twenty
years long time interval, including the twenty simulations characterised by different seeds. Boxes enclose
the values from the first to the third quartile, and include whiskers, which extend up to the minimum and
maximum data points that are not considered outliers. The horizontal segments inside the boxes represent
the median of the distribution. Moreover, in order to give a complete overview of the model response, we
plot also the time series of the most important variables of interest, so to show the trend during the entire
twenty years long simulation; all time series considered refer to a specific seed.
Our analysis aims to investigate the behavior of DADs at a micro level in order to verify the possible existence
of phenomena that characterize the “Increasing-returns World”, see Arthur (1996), and at the macro level
to asses the impact of this new industrial sector on the economic dynamics.
3.2. “Competitive pricing” and “collusive pricing” business dynamics analysis
As we can see in Fig.2(a), “competitive pricing” scenarios are characterized by higher values of TFP (γf )
compared to the “collusive pricing” ones, independently of the value of the innovation probability function
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shape parameter η; this is due to the higher unit user license price pDd (whose distribution is reported in
Fig.2(b)), that in case of “competitive pricing” can be managed by the DADs in order to increase their rev-
enues. Higher turnover does not necessarily involve higher R&D intensity, represented by the person months
employed by the DAD, because, as already explained in the previous section, we link the cost structure to
the revenues structure through the average wage w, see Eq. 6. So, the variable that effectively affects the
R&D intensity is the mark-up λ, which in case of “collusive pricing” is fixed throughout the simulation,
while in the other case varies according to the DAD pricing strategy, see Eq. 6. In presence of “competitive
pricing”, the average value of the mark-up λ results to be higher, see Fig.4(b), and this fact leads to higher
employment in the DADs industrial sector (see Fig. 2(c)), and as a consequence to a greater average TFP
γf . At the same time, obviously the TFP γf increases with η which determines the shape of the innovation
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Figure 2: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any values of η and for any pricing scenario considered, the
distribution of: the average total factor productivity γf (a), the average unit user license price pDd (b), the employment in the
DADs industrial sector (c), the Herfindahl market power index (d). Each boxplot reports the distribution of the time averages
over a twenty-years-long time period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
probability function, see 1. The parameter η sets the likelihood that cumulated R&D activities may have an
actual impact. In this respect, R&D intensity is linked to the mark-up λ. It is very important to note that
the competition between DADs, related to the possibility of freely managing the price of their licenses leads
to an increase in the average price itself compared to the “collusive pricing” case, but, at the same time, it in-
volves a higher quality of digital capital assets for the consumption good producers, which is reflected by the
TFP γf . In fact, in the “collusive pricing” case, DADs are limited in hiring new researchers because of their
lower mark-up λ and obviously this fact implies a lower productivity for their digital assets. Furthermore,
the competition between DADs established by the “competitive pricing” is accentuated by η; indeed the
unit license price pDd decreases as the innovation probability function shape parameter η enhances. At the
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same time, notwithstanding the average price decreases in case of high values of η, the market concentration
increases4, as it is visible in Fig.2(d). This emerging phenomenon, that we call “converse concentration
effect” appears in contradiction with the standard wisdom, according to which competitive markets, char-
acterised by lower prices, are not concentrated. In this case, the competition represented by lower prices
and consequently by lower values of mark-up λ, arises in order to contrast the market concentration that
characterize the “Increasing-returns World” in which, by exploiting the right wave, a firm can become the
leader market. What stimulates the emergence of a product on others, and consequently the birth of market
concentration, is competitiveness; after acquiring the highest market share, the leader company can afford to
raise its price but always in agreement with the value perceived by the customer (related to the productivity
and price). At the same time other competitors, in order to gain market shares, tend to decrease their
product prices. The results is a reduction of the average price. Therefore, digital assets market turns out
to be very susceptible to unit license prices pDd variations and the result is the absence of price overshoot
effects, see also Fig. 5 (c).
It is worth noting that the productivity (which represents the digital asset quality inside the model) and the
“right price” combined together are the key to the company’s success. On the other hand, in the “collusive
pricing” scenario, the Herfindahl index turns out to be high for each value of η; this happens because only
“fortune” leads to the emergence of a market leader and not a decision-making strategy. In particular, “for-
tune” is represented by the randomness related to Eq. 1 which is not counterbalanced by any “competitive
pricing” strategy.
Going further with the analysis, the high employment in the digital technologies sector, in case of “compet-
itive pricing”, seems to represent the transition from a mass-production economy to an high-tech services
economy. The “displacement effect” in the consumption goods industrial sector, due to the enhancement of
productivity of the digital assets, is contrasted by the creation of new jobs in the sector of the DADs. This
behaviour is clearly visible in Fig. 3 (a) and (b) where the employment concerning the DADs industrial
sector increases over time, while CGPs hire less and less employees because of the high digital assets pro-
ductivity (or TFP γf ). As a matter of fact, it represents what Acemoglu calls the “productivity effect”: the
higher demand for labor from the digital technologies industrial sector contrasts the “displacement effect”
generated by the digital transformation of the economy. Notwithstanding the creation of these new job
opportunities, at the same time, for high level of TFP γf DADs are not able to absorb all the unemployment
created by their digital assets; Fig. 4(a) shows an increase of unemployment caused by the enhancement
of the innovation probability function shape parameter η over time in both cases. It is interesting to note
that for the first two values of η (0.05 and 0.1) the unemployment is higher in case of “collusive pricing”;
this is related to the fact that up to these values, in case of “competitive pricing”, DADs can absorb the
unemployment caused by their digital assets. Beyond those values, the “displacement effect” is too high;
in fact, we can see a significant difference between average productivity in the two cases, see Fig. 2(a). As
shown in Fig. 4 (c), the total number of licenses sold decreases with η both in case of “competitive” and
collusive “pricing“; logically, this is due to the higher value of TFP γf which involves a lower stock of capital
goods for the same output. Accordingly to the trend of TFP γf , in case of “collusive pricing” the number
of licenses is higher compared to the “competitive pricing” case.
3.3. Competitiveness in the ”competitive pricing” case
In this subsection, we present a micro-analysis concerning the competitive dynamics involving the digital
assets industrial sector in the “competitive pricing” case. Fig. 5 displays the trend of the most important
variables related to DADs already mentioned above. It is very interesting to notice that a company assumes
a leading market position; the emergence of this DAD on others is due to successful R&D activities, which
allows it to develop technologies with a higher productivity. Besides the innovation probability function
shape parameter η, R&D activities are influenced by the cumulated person months Md employed since the
latest improvement: the higher the value of Md, the higher the probability to develop an improved version
of digital asset, see Eq. 1. The cumulated person months Md is influenced by the revenue, therefore, the
4to represent the market concentration we use a standard measure: the Herfindahl index, see Kwoka (1985)
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Figure 3: The figure displays various time series in case of “competitive pricing” and η = 0.3; in particular it shows: the
percentage (a) and number of employees (b) in the various industrial sectors: consumption good producers (CGPs), capital
good producer (KGP), digital assets developers (DADs); total unemployment (c) and average total factor productivity γf (d).
All time series refer to a specific replication which is representative of the system average trend in case of “competitive pricing”
and η = 0.3.
DAD with the highest market share performs the highest R&D. Despite the attempt of other DADs to
recover the lost market shares, through a decrease of their license prices, on the long-term the leader DAD
improves its product and the higher productivity of its digital assets covers the price difference with respect
to products competitor. This trend could be considered as a representation of Arthur theory concerning the
economy of “increasing returns”, according to which, thanks to its ability and strategy, a company could
lock-in the market. Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows that, even if the DAD2 has a higher number of users (that
are CGPs) compared to DAD3, the latter has sold (or renewed) a higher number of licenses in the middle of
the simulation (around time 96), because licences are proportional to the capital stocks of user companies.
This is what seems to make the difference because revenues depend on licenses and not on users in general.
This result underlines the importance for the DAD to have stable customers and to possibly guarantee
their growth, because this could determine a growth of the high-tech producer itself. Therefore, the model
highlights an interdependence between the two different industrial sectors, showing how a potential slowing-
down in the CGPs economic activity could determine a deceleration in the DADs activity. In other words,
CGPs sustain DADs helping them to innovate their products and, at the same time, CGPs, in order to be
more productive and competitive, need digital assets. The interaction between these two industrial sectors
highlights the complexity of the intangible digital economy.
3.4. The digital economy from a macroeconomic perspective
As shown in Fig. 6(d), in both pricing cases, the consumption good price level decreases with high values
of the innovation probability function shape parameter η, due to the increase of the average TFP γf . The
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Figure 4: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any values of η and for any pricing scenario considered, the
distribution of: unemployment (%) (a), average mark-up λ (b) and total number of licenses in the economy (c). Each boxplot
reports the distribution of the time averages over a twenty-years-long time period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
latter allows to save both capital and labor force, as we can see from the higher unemployment, see Fig. 4
(a). In other words, higher values of TFP determine a decrease in the production costs. In this respect,
the lower average unit user license price pDd have a positive impact on the price of consumption goods,
as it is shown in Fig. 2 (b). In fact, CGPs follow a mark-up pricing rule on unit costs, where costs are
represented by: wages, debt interests, licenses and training courses, see Plott and Sunder (1982); Fabiani
et al. (2006). Fig. 6 (c) shows a slight decrease of the average wage characterizing the economy which
influences the consumption good price level. Moreover, Fig. 6 (c) shows an important difference between
the two market scenarios: the average wage is much higher in case of “competitive pricing”. According to
the mark-up pricing-rule on unit costs, the “collusive pricing” case shows lower consumption goods prices
because of lower average wage w and unit user license price pDd , see Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 6(c) respectively.
In case of “competitive pricing”, the higher average wage w, representative of a greater purchasing power,
determines higher real sales compared to the “collusive pricing” case for any value of η. The decrease of the
central bank interest rate with the enhancement of η shows the intent of the policy maker to increase the
employment, see Fig. 6 (a).
4. Conclusion
The computational results presented in the paper are able to capture the essence related to the new digital
technologies world and the stylized facts that characterize the existing literature. Furthermore, the economic
dynamics emerged from the simulations shows interesting properties both at the micro and at the macro
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Figure 5: The figure displays various time series in case of “competitive pricing” and η = 0.3; in particular it shows: number
of licenses (a), number of users (b), unit user license price pDd (c) and total factor productivity γf (d) of the three different
digital assets developers. All time series refer to a specific replication which is representative of the system average trend in
case of “competitive pricing” and η = 0.3.
levels. The existing differences between competitive and collusive pricing point out very interesting aspects.
Both cases lead to the success of a company with respect to competitors but, in case of “competitive pricing”,
competitiveness stimulates the development of more productive digital assets and a higher employment in the
industrial sector of digital assets producers. The “converse concentration effect” shows that very concentrated
markets present lower average license prices due to “aggressive” decision-making strategies. In other words,
this phenomenon leads to “competitive concentrations” in the digital world. The effect of digital technologies
on the labour market seems to be crucial about the real possible consequences of this new technological wave
which could transform considerably the economy, in particular from an employment perspective. In case of
“competitive pricing” the model highlights a clear economic transformation in which the industrial sector of
mass-production replaces workers with increasingly productive technologies, while the digital assets producers
hire workers in order to develop and improve these technologies. Nevertheless, the unemployment increases
in the long-term within the model because of the increasing digital assets productivity. Probably, we should
see these results as a warning for our society, that, in order to maintain a social stability, must be prepared
to this new technological wave, whose impact is not yet well assessable. The education system will play a
crucial role because it will have the task of forming the new generation of “digital workers”. This could
ensure in the future a smoother transition towards the “real” digital revolution which probably we’re just
experiencing; in this way people will be prepared to new job position in digital services and manufacturing.
Our next research will focus on the study of government policies, concerning social welfare and education,
which could facilitate and promote the transition to the future digital world.
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Figure 6: The figure shows a series of boxplots representing, for any values of η and for any pricing scenario considered, the
distribution of: Central bank interest rate (a), real sales (b), average wage (c), consumption good price level (d). Each boxplot
reports the distribution of the time averages over a twenty-years-long time period for each one of the twenty seeds considered.
20
References
Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P., 2017. Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets. Working Paper
23285. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P., 2018a. Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work. Working Paper 24196.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P., 2018b. Automation and new tasks: The implications of the task content of
production for labor demand. Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, 3–30.
Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P., 2018c. Low-skill and high-skill automation. Journal of Human Capital 12,
204–232.
Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P., 2018d. Modeling automation. AEA Papers and Proceedings 108, 48–53.
Aghion, P., Jones, B.F., Jones, C.I., 2017. Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth. Working Paper
23928. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Arthur, W.B., 1989. Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events. Economic
Journal 99, 116–31.
Arthur, W.B., 1990. Positive feedbacks in the economy. Scientific American 262, 92–99.
Arthur, W.B., 1994. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. University of Michigan
Press.
Arthur, W.B., 1996. Increasing returns and the new world of business. Harvard business review 74, 100–109.
Arthur, W.B., 1999. Complexity and the economy. Science 284, 107–109.
Arthur, W.B., 2014. Complexity and the Economy. Oxford University Press.
Belleflamme, P., Peitz, M., 2018. Platforms and network effects, in: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial
Organization: Applications. volume 2, pp. 286–317.
Brynjolfsson, E., McAfee, A., 2011. Race Against The Machine: How The Digital Revolution Is Accelerating
Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Transforming Employment and The Economy. Digital
Frontier Press.
Brynjolfsson, E., McAfee, A., 2014. The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of
Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton & Co Inc.
Caiani, A., Russo, A., Gallegati, M., 2019. Does inequality hamper innovation and growth? An AB-SFC
analysis. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 29, 177–228.
Carroll, C.D., 2001. A theory of the consumption function, with and without liquidity constraints. Journal
of Economic Perspectives 15, 23–45.
Cotteleer, M.M., Sniderman, B., 2017. Forces of change: Industry 4.0. Deloitte Insights .
Dawid, H., Gemkow, S., 2014. How do social networks contribute to wage inequality? Insights from an
agent-based analysis. Industrial and Corporate Change 23, 1171–1200.
Dawid, H., Gemkow, S., Harting, P., Kabus, K., Wersching, K., Neugart, M., 2008. Skills, innovation, and
growth: An agent-based policy analysis. Journal of Economics and Statistics 228, 251–275.
Dawid, H., Harting, P., van der Hoog, S., Neugart, M., 2019. Macroeconomics with heterogeneous agent
models: fostering transparency, reproducibility and replication. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 29,
467–538.
21
Dawid, H., Harting, P., Neugart, M., 2014. Economic convergence: Policy implications from a heterogeneous
agent model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 44, 54–80.
Dawid, H., Harting, P., Neugart, M., 2018. Cohesion policy and inequality dynamics: Insights from a
heterogeneous agents macroeconomic model. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 150, 220–
255.
Dawid, H., Reimann, M., 2011. Diversification: a road to inefficiency in product innovations? Journal of
Evolutionary Economics 21, 191–229.
Doraszelski, U., Jaumandreu, J., 2018. Measuring the Bias of Technological Change. Journal of Political
Economy 126, 1027–108.
Dosi, G., Fagiolo, G., Roventini, A., 2010. Schumpeter meeting keynes: A policy-friendly model of endoge-
nous growth and business cycles. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34, 1748–1767.
Elsner, W., Heinrich, T., Schwardt, H., 2014. The Microeconomics of Complex Economies. 1 ed., Elsevier.
Fabiani, S., Druant, M., Hernando, I., Kwapil, C., Landau, B., Loupias, C., Martins, F., Math, T., Sabbatini,
R., Stahl, H., Stokman, A., 2006. What Firms’ Surveys Tell Us about Price-Setting Behavior in the Euro
Area. International Journal of Central Banking 2, 3–47.
Fanti, L., 2018. An AB-SFC Model of Induced Technical Change along Classical and Keynesian Lines.
MPRA Paper. University Library of Munich, Germany.
Farrell, J., Klemperer, P., 2007. Chapter 31: Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs
and Network Effects, in: Handbook of Industrial Organization. volume 3, pp. 1967–2072.
Fontana, M., 2010. Can neoclassical economics handle complexity? the fallacy of the oil spot dynamic.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 76, 584–596.
Fraser, R.W., 1985. Uncertainty and the theory of mark-up pricing. Bulletin of Economic Research 37,
55–64.
Gallegati, M., 2018. Complex agent-based models. New Economic Windows, Springer.
Godin, A., Caverzasi, E., 2014. Post-Keynesian stock-flow-consistent modelling: a survey. Cambridge
Journal of Economics 39, 157–187.
Godley, W., Lavoie, M., 2012. Monetary economics: An integrated approach to credit, money, income,
production and wealth. Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Goldstein, J., 1986a. Markup Variability and Flexibility: Theory and Empirical Evidence. The Journal of
Business 59, 599–621.
Goldstein, J.P., 1986b. Mark-Up Pricing over the Business Cycle: The Microfoundations of the Variable
Mark-Up. Southern Economic Journal 53, 233.
Good, I.J., 1966. Speculations concerning the first ultraintelligent machine. Advances in Computers 6, 31–88.
Goos, M., Manning, A., 2007. Lousy and lovely jobs: The rising polarization of work in britain. Review of
Economics and Statistics 89, 118–133.
Haskel, J., Westlake, S., 2017. Capitalism without Capital. Princeton University Press.
Heinrich, T., 2018. Network Externalities and Compatibility Among Standards: A Replicator Dynamics and
Simulation Analysis. Computational Economics 52, 809–837.
Hommes, C., LeBaron, B., 2018. Computational Economics: Heterogeneous Agent Modeling. North Holland.
22
Kalt, J.P., 1978. Technological Change and Factor Substitution in the United States: 1929- 1967. Interna-
tional Economic Review 19, 761–775.
Kang, H.S., Lee, J.Y., Choi, S., Kim, H., Park, J.H., Son, J.Y., Kim, B.H., Noh, S.D., 2016. Smart
manufacturing: Past research, present findings, and future directions. International Journal of Precision
Engineering and Manufacturing-Green Technology 3, 111–128.
Kwoka, J., 1985. The herfindahl index in theory and practice. Antitrust Bulletin 30, 915–947.
Mazzocchetti, A., Raberto, M., Teglio, A., Cincotti, S., 2018. Securitization and business cycle: an agent-
based perspective. Industrial and Corporate Change 27, 1091–1121.
Mokyr, J., Vickers, C., Ziebarth, N.L., 2015. The history of technological anxiety and the future of economic
growth: Is this time different? Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 31–50.
Nordhaus, W.D., 2015. Are We Approaching an Economic Singularity? Information Technology and the
Future of Economic Growth. SSRN Electronic Journal .
North, M., Macal, C., 2007. Managing Business Complexity: Discovering Strategic Solutions With Agent-
Based Modeling and Simulation. Oxford University Press.
Ozel, B., Nathanael, R.C., Raberto, M., Teglio, A., Cincotti, S., 2019. Macroeconomic implications of
mortgage loan requirements: an agent-based approach. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
14, 7–46.
Parrott, A., Lane, W., 2017. Industry 4.0 and the power of the digital twin. Deloitte University Press .
Petrovic´, M., Ozel, B., Teglio, A., Raberto, M., Cincotti, S., 2017. Eurace Open: An agent-based multi-
country model. Working Paper 2017/09. Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castello´n (Spain).
Platt, D., 2019. A Comparison of Economic Agent-Based Model Calibration Methods. SSRN Electronic
Journal .
Plott, C.R., Sunder, S., 1982. Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An
Application of Rational-Expectations Models. Journal of Political Economy 90, 663–698.
Ponta, L., Raberto, M., Teglio, A., Cincotti, S., 2018. An Agent-based Stock-flow Consistent Model of the
Sustainable Transition in the Energy Sector. Ecological Economics 145, 274–300.
Pyka, A., Gilbert, N., Ahrweiler, P., 2010. Agent-based modelling of innovation networks – the fairytale of
spillover. Understanding Complex Systems 2009, 101–126.
Raberto, M., Ozel, B., Ponta, L., Teglio, A., Cincotti, S., 2018. From financial instability to green finance:
the role of banking and credit market regulation in the eurace model. Journal of Evolutionary Economics
, 1–37.
Raberto, M., Teglio, A., Cincotti, S., 2012. Debt, deleveraging and business cycles: An agent-based perspec-
tive. Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 6, 1–49.
Solow, R., 1957. Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function. The Review of Economics and
Statistics 39, 312–320.
Teglio, A., Mazzocchetti, A., Ponta, L., Raberto, M., Cincotti, S., 2019. Budgetary rigour with stimulus in
lean times: Policy advices from an agent-based model. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
157, 59–83.
Teglio, A., Raberto, M., Cincotti, S., 2012. The impact of banks’ capital adequacy regulation on the economic
system: An agent-based approach. Advances in Complex Systems 15, 1–27.
23
Uzawa, H., 1961. Neutral Inventions and the Stability of Growth Equilibrium. The Review of Economic
Studies 28, 117–124.
Vermeulen, B., Kesselhut, J., Pyka, A., Saviotti, P.P., 2018. The impact of automation on employment: Just
the usual structural change? Sustainability 10, 1–27.
Vermeulen, B., Pyka, A., 2014. Technological progress and effects of (Supra) regional innovation and produc-
tion collaboration. An agent-based model simulation study, in: IEEE/IAFE Conference on Computational
Intelligence for Financial Engineering, Proceedings (CIFEr), pp. 357–364.
Vermeulen, B., Pyka, A., 2018. The Role of Network Topology and the Spatial Distribution and Structure
of Knowledge in Regional Innovation Policy: A Calibrated Agent-Based Model Study. Computational
Economics 52, 773–808.
Vivarelli, M., 2014. Innovation, employment and skills in advanced and developing countries: A survey of
economic literature. Journal of Economic Issues 48, 123–154.
24
